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INTRODUCTION
On February 1, 2000, the United States Patent and Trade-
mark Office (PTO) awarded inventors William T. Dalebout and
Steven Mott, along with their assignee ICON Health & Fitness,
Inc. (Icon) a patent entitled “Exercising Device with Elliptical
Movement” (the ‘710 patent).1  Over eight years later, Icon en-
forced the ‘710 patent against Octane Fitness, LLC (Octane),
alleging that the sale and manufacture of the Octane Fitness
Q47 Series exercise device infringed the ‘710 patent.2  Nearly
four years later, in 2011, the district court granted Octane’s
motion for summary judgment, holding that Octane did not
infringe the ‘710 patent;3 however, because the court denied
Octane’s motion for attorneys’ fees under the Patent Act’s fee-
shifting provision, the battle had only just begun.4
After Octane appealed the denial of a fee award to the Fed-
eral Circuit, which affirmed the district court’s decision, the
Supreme Court reversed.5  In doing so, the Court overruled
1 U.S. Patent No. 6,019,710 (filed Jan. 6, 1998).
2 See Report & Recommendation at 1–2, Icon Health & Fitness, Inc. v. Oc-
tane Fitness, LLC, No. 09–CV–319 (ADM/SRN), 2010 WL 1839326, at *1 (D.
Minn. Feb 4, 2010).
3 See Icon Health & Fitness, Inc. v. Octane Fitness, LLC, No. 09–319 ADM/
SER, 2011 WL 2457914, at *10 (D. Minn. June 17, 2011) (Memorandum opinion
and order), aff’d, 496 F. app’x 57 (Fed. Cir. 2012), rev’d, 134 S. Ct. 1749 (2014).
4 See Octane Fitness, LLC, 134 S. Ct. at 1751.
5 Id. at 1751, 1758.
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existing Federal Circuit precedent and lowered the bar for dis-
trict courts to award attorneys’ fees in patent cases.6  In a
companion case, the Court dictated that the Federal Circuit
must grant broad deference to district court rulings on fee
awards in patent cases, despite the Federal Circuit’s past prac-
tice of substituting such determinations with its own indepen-
dent judgment.7
The resulting liberalized fee-shifting framework implies a
simple and straightforward message: Patent trolls beware.8  In-
deed, “patent trolls,” or (more courteously) “patent assertion
entities,” i.e., businesses that accumulate patents in order to
extract royalties, settlements, or verdicts rather than develop-
ing products,9 have garnered much attention recently from
courts and commentators alike.10  Nonetheless, the activity
that seems to irk many of these commentators—extracting eco-
nomic benefit with the threat of litigation—is nothing new.
Parties have used the threat of litigation as bargaining leverage
outside the context of intellectual property for quite some
time.11  In the context of patent disputes, however, these sorts
of lawsuits bear a troubling parallelism with their conse-
6 See id. at 1752–53 (abrogating Brooks Furniture Mfg., Inc. v. Dutalier
Intern., Inc., 393 F.3d 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2005)).
7 See Highmark Inc. v. Allcare Health Mgmt. Sys., Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1744,
1747–48 (2014).
8 See Douglas R. Nemec & Hoda Rifai-Bashjawish, In a Nutshell: What to
Expect in Intellectual Property Litigation, INTELL. PROP. & TECH. L.J., Apr. 2014, at
3-4 (“The Supreme Court’s interest in the fee-shifting issue is no doubt related to
the concerns over patent litigation costs and frivolous claims that have prompted
the legislative and executive initiatives.  Fee-shifting is meant to curtail spurious
patent claims and eliminate weak patents by giving parties the incentive to fight
patent suits and collaterally prevent parties from reasserting weak patents.”).
9 See Thomas A. Hemphill, The Paradox of Patent Assertion Entities, AMERI-
CAN (Aug. 12, 2013), http://www.american.com/archive/2013/august/the-para-
dox-of-patent-assertion-entities [http://perma.cc/8EL6-STRW] (discussing and
quoting FED. TRADE COMM’N, THE EVOLVING IP MARKETPLACE: ALIGNING PATENT NOTICE
AND REMEDIES WITH COMPETITION 8 & n.5 (2011)).
10 See, e.g., InternetAd Sys., LLC v. Opodo Ltd., 481 F. Supp. 2d 596, 601
(N.D. Tex. 2007) (discussing accused infringer’s allegation that characterized
plaintiffs as “patent trolls”); Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and
Royalty Stacking, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1991, 2008–11 (2007) (summarizing the capabil-
ity of “so-called patent trolls” to threaten injunctions on allegedly infringing prod-
ucts to extract settlements); Giordana Mahn, Keeping Trolls Out of Courts and Out
of Pocket: Expanding the Inequitable Conduct Doctrine, 45 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1245,
1279–80 (2014) (discussing patent troll legislation); James F. McDonough III,
Comment, The Myth of the Patent Troll: An Alternative View of the Function of
Patent Dealers in an Idea Economy, 56 EMORY L.J. 189, 198–200 (2006) (criticizing
use of the term “patent troll”).
11 See, e.g., Arthur L. Goodhart, Costs, 38 YALE L.J. 849, 860–62 (1929)
(reviewing English procedural rules allowing “a judge to prevent the use of the
courts as machinery for extortion”).
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quences: whereas the suits themselves are unoriginal, they
have a damning effect on innovation and the legitimacy of
America’s approach to preserving and encouraging innova-
tion—the patent system.12
Conversely, the costs that such litigants may use as lever-
age have changed over time.  Specifically, the prevalence of
e-discovery, with nearly limitless amounts of discoverable ma-
terial and correspondingly immense costs, harkened a new era
in civil litigation.13  And although the Supreme Court promptly
sought to stomp out the nefarious patent troll—cutting against
the American rule that parties bear their own litigation costs,
no less—litigants remain uncertain of which party will bear the
costs of e-discovery.14  Thus, while patent trolls prompted
rather liberal fee-shifting in a particular area of litigation,
e-discovery cost shifting, which implicates litigation gener-
ally,15 remains underdeveloped.
In this Note, I argue that the Octane Fitness-Highmark
framework is a remedial approach to abusive patent litigation
that is ultimately misplaced and will likely do more harm than
good.  Alternatively, such litigation should spur American legis-
lators and courts to make lemonade out of lemons, and system-
ically reform America’s patent and civil litigation systems with
an eye toward forcing the PTO, as well as litigants, to internal-
ize social costs that these entities create.  In Part I, I provide a
background of fee-shifting regimes, the costs of patent litiga-
tion, and the role that abusive patent litigants play in the re-
cent liberalization of fee-shifting in patent cases, and conclude
that fee-shifting in this context is inappropriate.  In Part II, I
12 Eric Rogers & Young Jeon, Inhibiting Patent Trolling: A New Approach for
Applying Rule 11, 12 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 291, 295 (2014) (“While nui-
sance lawsuits are not new, the direct, focused, and widespread negative effects of
nuisance patent lawsuits on innovation and productive entities by those neither
innovating nor producing anything makes these lawsuits particularly damaging
to society” and to “the legitimacy of the patent system as a whole.”).
13 See generally David Degnan, Accounting for the Costs of Electronic Discov-
ery, 12 MINN. J.L. SCI.  & TECH. 151, 151–55 (2011) (discussing the complexities of
e-discovery and noting that experts estimate the costs of such discovery to be
“upwards of $30,000 per gigabyte” (citing Herbert L. Roitblat, Search & Informa-
tion Retrieval Science, 8 SEDONA CONF. J. 192, 192 (2007)).
14 See MICHAEL R. ARKFELD, ARKFELD ON ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY AND EVIDENCE
§ 4.7(E) (3d ed. 2015) (reviewing conflicting court decisions regarding the award of
e-discovery costs).
15 See Victor E. Schwartz & Christopher E. Appel, Rational Pleading in the
Modern World of Civil Litigation: The Lessons and Public Policy Benefits of Twombly
and Iqbal, 33 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1107, 1148–49 (2010) (asserting that bur-
dens on defendants, which include “responding to costly and wasteful discovery
fishing expeditions, have become increasingly onerous under modern e-discovery,
and in the increasingly complex modern world of civil litigation generally”).
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discuss the recent history of fee-shifting under the Patent Act
and introduce the deleterious effects that the Octane Fit-
ness-Highmark framework will create.  In Part III, I expand on
these effects and argue that liberalized fee-shifting in patent
cases will create problems for courts, litigants, patentees, and
the patent system as a whole.  In Part IV, I present a normative
goal for necessary reforms in order to defeat abusive patent
litigation and propose three reforms to this end.
I
BACKGROUND
Arguments in support of fee-shifting vary across countries,
fields of law, and discrete issues within those fields.  In order to
analyze the flaws of liberalized fee-shifting in patent cases,
subpart A considers normative, historical, and behavioral ra-
tionales for and against fee-shifting regimes; subpart B details
the costs associated with patent prosecution and enforcement;
and subpart C discusses the role that patent trolls have come
to play in the movement toward liberalized fee-shifting and why
this ad hoc solution, though it targets abusive patent litigants,
may ultimately miss its mark.
A. Fee-shifting Regimes
Most foreign jurisdictions have adopted various formula-
tions of “loser pays” regimes in civil litigation, i.e., default rules
requiring a losing party to pay for at least a portion of a prevail-
ing party’s litigation expenses.16  Because of its roots in English
common law, commentators often refer to this default fee-shift-
ing rule as the “English rule.”17  Conversely, the United States
has generally avoided “loser pays” regimes, instead opting for a
default rule that courts and commentators have deemed the
“American [r]ule,” under which parties generally bear their own
costs and fees.18  Courts, legislators, and private parties have
16 See Comment, Court Awarded Attorney’s Fees and Equal Access to the
Courts, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 636, 639 (1974) (“In virtually every country outside the
United States, courts have awarded and continue to award attorney’s fees to the
prevailing party in ordinary lawsuits . . . .”).
17 See, e.g., Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, The English Versus the
American Rule on Attorney Fees: An Empirical Study of Public Company Contracts,
98 CORNELL L. REV. 327, 329 (2013) (noting that most Western legal systems other
than the United States use the English rule); Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., The Legal
Theory of Attorney Fee-shifting: A Critical Overview, 1982 DUKE L.J. 651, 653
(1982) (stating that developed nations of “English legal heritage” inheriting the
rule rarely explain its theoretical justification).
18 See Marx v. Gen. Revenue Corp., 133 S. Ct. 1166, 1175 (2013) (stating
that, under the “bedrock principle” of the American rule, “each litigant pays his
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nonetheless created exceptions to the American rule in certain
cases where the rationale behind a loser pays rule becomes
particularly attractive.19
1. Rationales in Support of the American and English
Rules
In general, given the potential benefits and burdens of
fee-shifting,20 deciding to adopt a default rule in favor of or
opposing fee-shifting becomes a complex task.  The variety of
fee-shifting rules further complicates this determination,21 and
adopting either default rule does not foreclose the possibility of
awarding or denying fee awards in a system that presumes the
opposite.22  Whether courts should award fees in a given legal
system therefore depends on two variables: (1) whether such
system is more amenable to a default rule awarding or, con-
versely, denying fees; and, after deciding upon either default
rule, (2) whether particular cases, or classes of cases, warrant
exceptions to the default rule.23
As to the first variable, foundational differences in the En-
glish and American legal systems have ultimately (and justifia-
bly) determined each country’s approach to fee-shifting.24
Specifically, the English judicial system has much more pre-
dictable outcomes because of its nonpartisan bench and al-
own attorney’s fees, win or lose, unless a statue or contract provides otherwise”
(quoting Hardt v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 560 U.S. 242, 252–53 (2010)).
19 See Rowe, Jr., supra note 17, at 653 n.8 (“The general American practice— R
absent a statute, contractual provision, or exceptional circumstances—provides no
fee-shifting . . . .” (emphasis added)).
20 See infra section I.A.3.
21 See Rowe, Jr., supra note 17, at 666–79 (discussing, within fee-shifting R
regimes, “whether in a class of cases or a particular case to award fees to the
winner; against whom to assess a fee to be awarded; and how much to award”).
22 Indeed, despite the common English-American comparison, a comprehen-
sive study of fee-shifting regimes would likely consider a broad variety of
fee-shifting provisions rather than merely two. See Theodore Eisenberg, Talia
Fisher & Issi Rosen-Zvi, When Courts Determine Fees in a System with a Loser
Pays Norm: Fee Award Denials to Winning Plaintiffs and Defendants, 60 UCLA L.
REV. 1452, 1454–55 (2013) (“Both systematic study of countries’ litigation cost
practices and empirical study of how private parties contract about litigation costs
suggest the inadequacy of the English rule-American rule dichotomy.”); see also
id. at 1459 (noting that even under “a firm loser pays rule, most English rule
jurisdictions temper their rule”; for instance, “[i]n Australia[,] it is estimated that
despite a loser pays rule, prevailing parties do not recover 40 to 50 percent of their
litigation costs”).
23 See Rowe, Jr., supra note 17, at 668–69. R
24 See John F. Vargo, The American Rule on Attorney Fee Allocation: The
Injured Person’s Access to Justice, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1567, 1571–90 (1993) (pro-
viding a historical account of the development of fee-shifting rules in England and
America).
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most complete abolition of jury trials.25  Conversely, the
American judicial system, with its emphasis on the right to a
jury trial, carries an air of unpredictability (or at least skepti-
cism).26  American practices therefore “leave more room for the
feeling that losers will often not have been unreasonable or
unjustified in insisting on litigation.”27  Furthermore, the
American judicial system regards access to the courts as a
crucial right, the potential costs of which should not deter mer-
itorious claims or defenses.28
The next section in this Note shows that an exception to
the American rule in the context of patent cases (i.e., the sec-
ond variable) should only apply if (1) it would further the equi-
table administration of the civil litigation system, or (2) it is
necessary to punish or deter misconduct in litigation.29  As I
argue in the remainder of this Note, fee-shifting in patent cases
does not meet either of these ends.  Indeed, although patent
trolls may be a call for reform, fee-shifting is not the appropri-
ate remedy.
2. Rationales in Support of Exceptions to the American
Rule
Generally, exceptions to the American rule requiring
fee-shifting fall under one of two categorical rationales, if not
both.30  Under one rationale, fee-shifting furthers the equitable
administration of the civil litigation system, such as by increas-
ing access to the courts for parties who might otherwise be
unable to afford an attorney or incentivizing enforcement of
certain causes of action that serve the public interest.31  Such
regimes also incentivize regulatory compliance by increasing
the economic costs of running afoul of the relevant regulatory
regime.32  Thus, a fee-shifting rule that this rationale supports
is tied to the particular cause of action to which it attaches,
25 Rowe, Jr., supra note 17, at 655. R
26 See id. at 655–56, 656 n.16.
27 Id. at 655–56.
28 See Vargo, supra note 24, at 1594–96 (asserting that despite a “historical[ ] R
recogni[tion of] the formal right of access for all, practical access was denied to the
poor because only the wealthy could afford to use the legal system,” and that the
modern approach seeks to “guarantee[ ] access to justice for all citizens”).
29 See infra section I.A.2.
30 See Rowe, Jr., supra note 17, at 652. R
31 Id. at 652–53.
32 See The Hon. M. Margaret McKeown & David J. Burman, Exceptions to the
American Rule—Statutory Fee Awards—Rationale, 5 BUS. & COM. LITIG. FED. CTS.
§ 52:16, Westlaw (database updated Dec. 2014).
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either by way of the class of potential plaintiffs that enforce it,
or the purpose of the cause of action.
Under a second rationale, courts may shift fees in order to
punish parties that engage in misconduct, such as deceitful,
disobedient, or oppressive litigation tactics, at their adversary’s
expense.33  Although comparable to a rule that imposes sanc-
tions for misconduct, this punitive flavor of fee-shifting is gen-
erally tied to the costs that the specific misconduct at issue
imposes.34  The objective of such a regime is not only to deter
such misconduct but also to recompense the victim of such
abuse for expenditures she would not have incurred but for the
culpable conduct,35 thereby forcing the culpable party to inter-
nalize externalities that would otherwise draw from the victim’s
pockets.36  As we will see, fee-shifting in patent cases purport-
edly falls under this second rationale.
3. Shortcomings of Fee-shifting
Despite the generally noble goals of fee-shifting regimes,
such provisions may also create negative effects.  Indeed,
fee-shifting in certain contexts may do more harm than good on
balance.37  For example, such rules could have a chilling effect
on plaintiffs with otherwise meritorious or novel claims,
thereby hindering substantive legal development and deterring
the enforcement.38  This potential decrease in enforcement ac-
tually cuts against one of fee-shifting’s underlying rationales—
that is, encouraging compliance.39
Additionally, the threat of paying a prevailing adversary’s
fees could cause some litigants to behave less rationally rather
than considering the additional costs that a court may impose
through a fee-shifting rule.  Specifically, litigants may have an
incentive to take their chances at trial rather than voluntarily
dismissing claims or settling, if doing so would render their
adversary a prevailing party deserving of a favorable ruling on
33 See Court Awarded Attorney’s Fees and Equal Access to the Courts, supra
note 16, at 645–46. R
34 See Rowe, Jr., supra note 17, at 660–61. R
35 See Jane P. Mallor, Punitive Attorneys’ Fees for Abuses of the Judicial
System, 61 N.C. L. REV. 613, 619–20 (1983).
36 See Rowe, Jr., supra note 17, at 660. R
37 See Laura E. Flenniken, Comment, No More Plain Meaning: Farrar v.
Hobby, 71 DENV. U. L. REV. 477, 487 (1994) (“The concept of fee-shifting is decep-
tively simple—the party causing the harm should pay the costs of remedying the
harm.  However, the sheer volume of litigation suggests the reality of fee-shifting
is not necessarily socially desirable or simple to implement.”).
38 Mallor, supra note 35, at 615. R
39 See supra note 32 and accompanying text. R
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attorneys’ fees.40  For example, in a patent infringement case
with multiple defendants, a plaintiff that has settled claims
against some defendants while others assert meritorious de-
fenses may have an incentive to see the case through to trial
and take a chance with a jury rather than a judge that may be
sympathetic to the holdout defendant after a voluntary dismis-
sal.41  This potential defect therefore not only increases litiga-
tion costs but also decreases the likelihood of settlement, and
as we will see, these effects are particularly problematic in
combating abusive patent litigation.42
B. The (Not So) Particular Costs of Patent Litigation
Although creating and enforcing patents is incredibly ex-
pensive, the requisite investments of time, resources, skill, and
creativity in obtaining and enforcing patents are tributes to the
value that modern society has placed on innovation, leading
one commentator to refer to intellectual property as “the new
wealth of nations.”43  Nevertheless, costs associated with liti-
gating patent cases are far from an idiosyncrasy of patent law;
rather, such expenses reflect broad trends in modern civil liti-
gation.44  Thus, courts should not approach costs associated
with patent litigation differently than they would in other areas
of law; rather, courts should view such costs as a symptom of
deficiencies in modern U.S. civil litigation, as well as the U.S.
patent system.
1. Costs of Obtaining Patents
In comparison with the costs of enforcing a patent, the
costs of obtaining a patent are relatively trifling, with estimates
generally being in the range of $20,000 for an individual paten-
tee.45  This relatively low cost, however, does not take into ac-
40 See Mark Liang & Brian Berliner, Fee Shifting in Patent Litigation, 18 VA.
J.L. & TECH. 59, 91–92 (2013) (“The American Rule . . . encourages plaintiffs with
questionable claims, but large claimed damages, to file suit.  There is less consen-
sus though on whether the British Rule encourages settlement and reduces litiga-
tion costs.  Empirical evidence in Britain is not convincing in either direction, and
commentators have mixed opinions.  Some argue that the British Rule scares
parties away from spending more on litigation, while others contend that with
higher stakes, parties are willing to spend even more to win.” (footnotes omitted)).
41 See, e.g., Scott Graham, After ‘Octane,’ Newegg Gets Second Bite at Attor-
ney Fees, RECORDER, Sept. 25, 2014, at 3 (discussing one such action).
42 See infra subpart III.B.
43 FRED WARSHOFSKY, THE PATENT WARS 3 (1994).
44 See infra subpart I.B.
45 See David Fagundes & Jonathan S. Masur, Costly Intellectual Property, 65
VAND. L. REV. 677, 687–90 (2012) (estimating the average total cost of obtaining a
patent at approximately $22,000); Clarisa Long, Patent Signals, 69 U. CHI. L. REV.
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count the total social costs that obtaining a patent may create;
in practice, the PTO commonly awards flawed patents that
should otherwise be invalid, rendering this process ripe for
reform.46  Indeed, these “bad patents”47 commonly result in
needless and costly litigation that could have been avoided by
denying patent applications or invalidating patents at the PTO
rather than in court.48
Thus, more comprehensive patent application and exami-
nation would likely result in avoiding disputes in the first in-
stance, rather than resolving disputes via litigation.49  This
approach would require increased investment in the initial
stages of a patent’s life, which many commentators oppose.50
Favoring this investment, however, represents an approach
that prefers prevention to cure, and it is likely more efficient
and effective in remedying abusive patent litigation than ad hoc
approaches such as broadened discretion to award fees in pat-
ent litigation.51
2. Costs of Enforcing Patents
After the smoke settles in a patent dispute, damages may
be colossal.52  And even before opening statements, the costs of
625, 639 n.44 (2002) (“Conservative estimates peg the administrative costs of
obtaining an average U.S. patent at $20,000.”).
46 See Jonathan S. Masur, Costly Screens and Patent Examination, 2. J.
LEGAL ANALYSIS 687, 687–89 (2010).
47 Generally speaking, “bad patents” are those “that in a perfect system
should never have been issued (for instance, because of obviousness or lack of
novelty).”  Note, Recasting the U.S. International Trade Commission’s Role in the
Patent System, 126 HARV. L. REV. 2337, 2337 (2013).
48 See Diane Bartz, Congress Approves Patent Overhaul Bill, REUTERS, (Sept.
8, 2011, 7:55 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/09/08/us-congress-
patent-idUSTRE7877CM20110908 [https://perma.cc/7WK6-MG96] (“Tech in-
dustry supporters of [a patent reform bill] believe a better-financed, better-run
patent office will issue fewer bad patents, which would help reduce litigation.”).
49 See Fagundes & Masur, supra note 45, at 688. R
50 See infra notes 193, 217, and accompanying text. R
51 See, e.g., William Hannah, Comment, Major Change, New Chapter: How
Inter Partes Review and Post Grant Review Proceedings Created By the America
Invents Act Will Shape Litigation Strategies, 17 INTELL. PROP. L. BULL. 27, 29 (2012)
(noting that the “median costs for Inter Partes Reexamination proceedings in-
clude: thirty-five thousand dollars to prepare and file, one hundred thousand
dollars through an appeal to the Board of Patent Appeal and Interferences, and
two hundred thousand dollars through an appeal to a Federal Circuit,” however,
“[t]he median cost of patent litigation, where less than one million US dollars is at
stake, is six hundred and fifty thousand US dollars”).
52 See PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS LLP, 2015 PATENT LITIGATION STUDY 5 (2015),
http://www.pwc.com/us/en/forensic-services/publications/assets/2015-pwc-
patent-litigation-study.pdf [https://perma.cc/P8LW-TZK5] (reporting that the top
three largest initial adjudicated damages awards from 1995 through 2014 were
$1.673, $1.538, and $1.169 billion).
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waging patent litigation may be massive.53  Furthermore, litiga-
tion costs aside from damages or settlements are inevitable,
and each party will bear such costs regardless of the out-
come.54  Relatedly, litigants report that discovery costs, partic-
ularly for e-discovery, have become particularly burdensome in
recent years.55  Such costs are therefore the most assured
wrench for litigants to use as leverage against their adversaries
to obtain “nuisance value” settlements, which often result in
licensing or royalty agreements in patent cases.56  Limiting
such costs, making them more predictable from the outset of
litigation, or assuring that the proper party bears the brunt of
such costs are therefore desirable objectives, not only in patent
cases but also in modern civil litigation generally.
The most particular costs in patent litigation include those
related to requests for reexamination or review by the PTO by
which litigants may seek to invalidate an asserted patent57 and
payments to specialized professionals including attorneys, ex-
perts, and consultants.58  If one of the parties is a corporation,
other expenses may include lost opportunity costs of diverting
employees and resources from more productive activities, po-
tential exposure of confidential information to a competitor (or
to the market at large), and the risk of reduced sales due to the
threat that litigation poses to a customer’s business or use of a
potentially infringing product.59
Among the costs discussed above, however, the only purely
patent-specific costs are those related to PTO reexamination or
review.  For one, although patent litigation may require hiring
53 See INTELL. PROP. INS. SERVS. CORP., AIPLA 2013 REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC
SURVEY (2013) (reporting that in 2013, patent infringement suits with an amount
in controversy ranging from $1 million to $10 million carried litigation costs of
$1.2 million dollars through discovery and $2.1 million through trial, aside from
damage or settlement amounts).
54 See JOHN W. SCHLICHER, SETTLEMENT OF PATENT LITIGATION AND DISPUTES: IM-
PROVING DECISIONS AND AGREEMENTS TO SETTLE AND LICENSE 57 (2011).
55 See INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. LEGAL SYS., CIVIL LITIGATION SUR-
VEY OF CHIEF LEGAL OFFICERS AND GENERAL COUNSEL BELONGING TO THE ASSOCIATION OF
CORPORATE COUNSEL 17 (2010) (noting that survey “[r]espondents who reported an
increase in pretrial litigation costs for the typical case most commonly cited dis-
covery in general, and e-discovery in particular, as the basis for the trend”).
56 See, e.g., Eon-Net LP v. Flagstar Bancorp, 653 F.3d 1314, 1327 (Fed. Cir.
2011) (upholding award of attorneys’ fees against patentee that offered settlement
amounts of less than ten percent of the cost that the defendant had spent on its
defense, and noting that such tactics “ensured that [patentee]’s baseless infringe-
ment allegations remained unexposed, allowing [patentee] to continue to collect
additional nuisance value settlements”).
57 See infra section IV.B.2.
58 See SCHLICHER, supra note 54, at 17. R
59 Id.
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professionals that are knowledgeable in the field of patent law,
litigation in many other legal fields often requires hiring experts
as witnesses or consultants, especially in complex commercial
disputes.60  Furthermore, expenses that are particular to cor-
porate litigants may also arise out of a variety of disputes and
not only patent litigation.  For example, product liability claims
(whether meritorious or not) can carry a number of adverse
consequences, including defense costs, bad publicity, loss of
sales, and further claims against the corporation.61
C. Patent Trolls: Scoundrels or Scapegoats?
1. Defining the Troll
Although the term “patent troll” is now a near-household
term,62 categorizing entities as such is no easy task due to the
lack of a widely accepted definition.63  Commentators credit
former Assistant General Counsel to Intel, Peter Detkin, for
coining the term in response to alleged patent infringement by
Intel.64  Since then, the term has taken on a substantially de-
rogatory connotation, usually referring to entities that license
patents or enforce patents but neither practice nor develop
patents.65  Thus, “nonpracticing entity,” or “NPE,” has become
60 See, e.g., BRYAN E. GATES, INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL—ABRIDGED & ANNO-
TATED, § 4.49.1.2 (2002) (noting “economists are available to provide assistance”);
TROY L. HARRIS & JOHN W. HINCHEY, INTERNATIONAL CONSTRUCTION ARBITRATION HAND-
BOOK § 13:27 (2014) (accountants as expert witnesses or consultants in construc-
tion arbitration); DAVID F. HERR ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF LITIGATION PRACTICE § 20.6
(2014) (providing guidelines for doctors as expert witnesses).
61 See Sidney K. Kanazawa & Dan R. Gallipeau, Minimizing Product Liability
Exposure: Practical Solutions for Manufacturers, 34 CAL. W. L. REV. 509, 512
(1998).
62 See, e.g., David Segal, Has Patent. Will Sue, N.Y. TIMES, Jul. 14, 2013, at
BU1 (noting that “[t]here is debate about the definition of patent trolls,” but that
“[t]he notoriety of trolls . . . arises from legal claims that, at a minimum, sound
absurd”); Edward Wyatt, F.T.C. Settles First Case Targeting ‘Patent Troll,’ N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 7, 2014, at B3; This American Life: When Patents Attack!, (National
Public Radio broadcast July 22, 2011), http://www.thisamericanlife.org/radio-
archives/episode/441/when-patents-attack [http://perma.cc/E63R-2SDS].
63 See Terrence P. McMahon et al., Who is a Troll? Not a Simple Answer, 7
SEDONA CONF. J. 159, 161–65 (2006).
64 See, e.g., Marc Morgan, Comment, Stop Looking Under the Bridge for Imagi-
nary Creatures: A Comment Examining Who Really Deserves the Title Patent Troll,
17 FED. CIR. B.J. 165, 166–67 (2008); Saurabh Vishnubhakat, What Patent Attor-
ney Fee Awards Really Look Like, 63 DUKE L.J. ONLINE 15, 16 (2014) (citing
Brenda Sandburg, You May Not Have a Choice. Trolling for Dollars, RECORDER (July
30, 2001) http://www.phonetel.com/pdfs/LWTrolls.pdf [http://perma.cc/XPX8-
JU9T]).
65 See InternetAd Sys., LLC v. Opodo Ltd., 481 F. Supp. 2d 596, 601 (N.D.
Tex. 2007) (defining patent trolls as “a small company who enforces patent rights
against accused infringers in an attempt to collect licensing fees, but does not
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a popular and somewhat less offensive synonym for such enti-
ties.66  Yet another semantic development, the term “patent
assertion entity,” or “PAE,” has come into being.  A PAE is
distinguishable from an NPE, which “encompasses patent own-
ers that primarily seek to develop and transfer technology,
such as universities and semiconductor design houses”;67 con-
versely, a PAE solely obtains patents for the purpose of enforc-
ing them in order to obtain licensing royalties, settlements, or
damages.68
Despite the search for a precise phrase to capture the es-
sence of a patent troll, the social (and for that matter, legal)
stigma surrounding such entities continues.  Indeed, because
of its prejudicial capacity, litigants now fight over use of the
term itself; for example, one court recently barred a defendant
in a patent infringement suit (namely, Apple) from referring to
the plaintiff as a “patent troll” at trial.69  Semantics aside, a
number of interested constituencies have called for reform that
would limit the proliferation of PAEs, NPEs, patent trolls, or
whatever other term that may attach to such entities.70
2. Demonizing the Troll
Regardless of whether PAEs are deserving of the negative
attention they draw, studies indicate that they now account for
a majority of patent cases filed in district courts.71  Many ac-
cuse PAEs of stifling innovation72 or making patent litigation,
and technology generally, more costly without creating any cor-
responding value.73  Indeed, President Obama’s 2014 State of
the Union address called for “a patent reform bill that allows
our businesses to stay focused on innovation, not costly, need-
manufacture products or supply services based on the patents in question” (cita-
tion omitted)).
66 See Ted Sichelman, Commercializing Patents, 62 STAN. L. REV. 341, 368
(2010).
67 FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 9, at 8 n.5. R
68 See id. at 8–9.
69 Pretrial Order Re: Motions in Limine at 2, GPNE Corp. v. Apple, Inc., No
12-CV-02885-LHK, 2013 WL 5754385 (N.D. Cal. June 24, 2014) (acknowledging
the connotations of such language).  Other barred phrases included “pirate,”
“bounty hunter,” “privateer,” “bandit,” “pater patent,” “stick up,” “shakedown,”
“playing the lawsuit lottery,” “corporate shell game,” and “a corporate shell.” Id.
70 See supra subpart I.B; see infra notes 75–76. R
71 See Liang & Berliner, supra note 40, at 71–72. R
72 See James Bessen et al., The Private and Social Costs of Patent Trolls: Do
Nonpracticing Entities Benefit Society by Facilitating Markets for Technology?,
REG., Winter 2011-2012, at 26, 31–34.
73 See Mark A. Lemley & A. Douglas Melamed, Missing the Forest for the
Trolls, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 2117, 2129 (2013).
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less litigation.”74  Interest groups in support of patent reform
have also formed, often deriving their funding from large tech
companies.75  In response, interest groups opposing patent re-
form have sprung up, arguing, for example, that such reform
would present “a fundamental weakening of patents for all in-
ventors.”76  In one rather entertaining episode, a popular come-
dian and podcaster, Adam Carolla, established the “Save Our
Podcasts Legal Defense Fund” after a PAE sued the entertainer
for infringing patents that allegedly covered podcasting.77
These efforts have caught the attention of federal and state
legislators, resulting in limited legislative reform.  Although
federal law might preempt various state efforts to regulate pat-
ent law, several state legislatures have passed laws that pro-
hibit “bad-faith patent assertions.”78  The first state to pass
such reform was Vermont, which enacted a statute allowing
the Vermont Attorney General or a “target” of a bad faith patent
assertion to bring a civil action against an asserting entity.79
Furthermore, according to the Computer Communications In-
dustry Association, as of January 14, 2015, eighteen states
(including Vermont) passed laws against bad faith patent as-
74 President Barack Obama, State of the Union Address (Jan. 27, 2014).
75 See, e.g., About Us, THE COAL. FOR 21ST CENTURY PATENT REFORM, http://
www.patentsmatter.com/about/coalition.php [http://perma.cc/YR23-TAWG]
(listing companies such as 3M, Boston Scientific, General Electric, Pfizer, Pep-
siCo, and Texas Instruments as members); About the Coalition, COAL. FOR PATENT
FAIRNESS, http://www.patentfairness.org/learn/about [http://perma.cc/LVB2-
V9DQ] (listing companies such as Adobe, Oracle, Samsung, Cisco, Blackberry,
and Google as supporting partners).
76 About Us, INNOVATION ALLIANCE, http://www.savetheinventor.com/about
[http://perma.cc/4VS7-YXRA]; see also, About Us, INNOVATION ALLIANCE, http://
www.innovationalliance.net/about-us/ [http://perma.cc/237B-DPAQ] (listing
companies such as Qualcomm, Inc., Dolby Laboratories, Inc., and Tessera as
members).
77 See Adam Carolla, Save Our Podcasts Legal Defense Fund, FUND ANYTHING
https://fundanything.com/en/campaigns/patenttroll [https://perma.cc/578P-
GLA7].  The PAE offered to dismiss the suit after discovering that podcasting is not
very lucrative; Carolla rejected the offer, but ultimately settled on confidential
terms. See Nilay Patel, Patent Troll Drops Suit Against Adam Carolla After Discov-
ering Podcasts Don’t Make Any Money, VERGE (Aug. 20, 2014, 8:53 AM), http://
www.theverge.com/2014/8/20/6048303/patent-troll-drops-suit-against-adam-
carolla [https://perma.cc/6TLR-PNFJ]; Press Release, Personal Audio, Adam
Carolla Rejects Dismissal from Podcasting Lawsuit (July 29, 2014).
78 See David Lee Johnson, Note, Facing Down the Trolls: States Stumble on
the Bridge to Patent-Assertion Regulation, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 2023, 2033–44
(2014).
79 See An Act Relating to Amending Consumer Protection Provisions for Pro-
pane Refunds, Unsolicited Demand for Payment, Bad Faith Assertions of Patent
Infringement and Failure to Comply with Civil Investigations, H. 299 (Vt. 2013).
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sertions, and an additional fourteen states have introduced
similar bills.80
The most recent and comprehensive patent reform at the
federal level is the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (AIA).81
Among other provisions, the AIA substantially reworks the pro-
cess by which patentees and third parties may challenge a
patent’s validity, with an aim toward increased objectivity and
predictability in patents.82  And although some commentators
assert that one of Congress’s primary motivations in enacting
the reform was to combat patent trolls,83 others argue that the
AIA does not go far enough in this arena.84
Despite Congress’s recent introduction of a number of bills
specifically targeting abusive patent litigation,85 many of these
initiatives have stalled.86  These bills largely failed due to objec-
tions from trial lawyers, pharmaceutical companies, and uni-
versities; one of their main items of contention was fee-shifting
provisions.87  Indeed, while supporters of such bills made fee-
shifting provisions a priority, opponents argue that such provi-
sions might deter meritorious claims.88  One proposal includ-
ing such provision is the SHIELD Act, which would shift fees
against patent holders that acquired their asserted patents
through secondary market transactions and do not practice the
80 See Computer & Commc’ns Indus. Ass’n, Patent Progress’s Guide to State
Patent Legislation, PATENT PROGRESS (Oct. 29, 2015), http://www.patentpro-
gress.org/patent-progress-legislation-guides/patent-progresss-guide-state-pat-
ent-legislation/ [http://perma.cc/4XVN-NXJK].
81 Pub. L. No. 112–29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) (codified in scattered sections of
35 U.S.C.).
82 See generally Robert A. Armitage, Understanding the America Invents Act
and its Implications for Patenting, 40 AIPLA Q.J. 1, 10–14 (2012) (discussing the
changes to the U.S. patent system resulting from the AIA).
83 See generally Tracie L. Bryant, Note, The America Invents Act: Slaying
Trolls, Limiting Joinder, 25 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 687, 689 (2012) (discussing section
19(d) of the AIA, which limits joinder of unrelated defendants in patent cases).
84 See Colleen V. Chien & Mark A. Lemley, Patent Holdup, The ITC, and the
Public Interest, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 15–16 (2012); Many Patents Still Pending,
ECONOMIST, Sept. 10, 2011, at 68.
85 See, e.g., Innovation Protection Act, H.R. 3349, 113th Cong. (2013); Patent
Transparency and Improvements Act of 2013, S. 1720, 113th Cong. (2013); End
Anonymous Patents Act, H.R. 2024, 113th Cong. (2013); Patent Litigation and
Innovation Act of 2013, H.R. 2639, 113th Cong. (2013).
86 See, e.g., Innovation Act, H.R. 3309, 113th Cong. (2013) (exemplifying a
patent reform bill that passed the House but not the Senate).
87 See Dan D’Ambrosio, Patent Reform Fight Ends in Retreat – for Now, USA
TODAY (July 9, 2014, 11:14 AM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/busi
ness/2014/07/08/patent-troll-legislation-fight/12392453 [http://perma.cc/
FG2A-5LU6].
88 Erin Mershon & Tony Romm, Patent Reform Hits Dead End in Senate,
POLITICO (May 21, 2014, 7:45 PM), http://www.politico.com/story/2014/05/
patent-reform-senate-106968.html [http://perma.cc/2UUT-WCWA].
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asserted patents.89  During Senate hearings regarding the Act,
some legislators lauded its fee-shifting provision, while another
pointed out that it improperly targets certain types of patent
owners rather than abusive patent litigation practices.90  Thus,
Congress’s (rather unsurprising) inability to agree on how to
deal with patent trolls, largely because of differences on
fee-shifting, warrants alternative, systemic reforms rather than
divisive, ad hoc remedies.
3. Defending the Troll
To be fair, whether so-called patent trolls deserve such
condemnation remains debatable.  Defenders of PAEs argue
that they accomplish various desirable ends within the patent
system, such as enforcing patents on behalf of inventors that
would otherwise lack resources to do so91 and increasing effi-
ciency in patent markets.92  Moreover, troll-type behavior and
the costs that such behavior seem to create may merely be
symptomatic of systemic deficiencies of patent prosecution and
litigation, or even civil litigation more generally.93  Within the
patent system, systemic problems in need of solution include
overissuance of otherwise invalid patents, overly broad inter-
pretations of issued patents, and a resulting uncertainty in the
legal strength of an issued patent.94
Furthermore, the costs associated with patent litigation
may simply be a symptom of broader trends in civil litigation.
89 Saving High-Tech Innovators from Egregious Legal Disputes Act of 2013,
H.R. 845, 113th Cong. (2013); see Lemley & Melamed, supra note 73, at 2177 R
n.247.
90 See Abusive Patent Litigation: The Issues Impacting American Competitive-
ness and Job Creation at the International Trade Commission and Beyond: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Intellectual Property, and the Internet of the H.
Comm. on the Judiciary (2013) (statement of Kevin Rhodes, Vice President and
Chief Intellectual Property Counsel, 3M Innovative Properties Company).
91 See FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 9, at 64. R
92 See James F. McDonough III, supra note 10, at 190 (“Patent trolls provide R
liquidity, market clearing, and increased efficiency to the patent markets . . . .”).
93 See ADAM B. JAFFE & JOSH LERNER, INNOVATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS 56–57
(2004) (asserting that “[t]he escalation of patent litigation that has occurred over
the last two decades may be due in part to a general trend toward a more litigious
society” and that such escalation is also due to greater ease in acquiring and
enforcing patents); Lemley & Melamed, supra note 73, at 2170 (“[W]e believe trolls R
are a symptom of the real problems, not their cause.  Trolls are opportunists that
exploit flaws in the patent system.  The growth of patent trolls, coupled with the
costs of practicing entity licensing and litigation, suggests systemic problems that
are not limited to trolls.”).
94 See JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: HOW JUDGES, BU-
REAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK 39, 47–57 (2008); JAFFE & LERNER,
supra note 93, at 171–72; Lemley & Melamed, supra note 73, at 2180. R
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Indeed, in 2010, ninety-eight percent of multinational compa-
nies surveyed reported that the costs of civil litigation, gener-
ally, were too high.95  One of the survey respondents explained
the inefficiencies of modern civil litigation:
The plaintiff[s’] lawyers take the tactic of suing as many de-
fendants as possible under as many legal theories as possible
to “see what sticks” . . . The defense attorneys, billing at an
hourly rate, benefit [from the resulting] broad discovery and
the amount of time and effort it requires . . . The judges . . .
often do not grant motions . . . that could serve to whittle the
complaint down to the true cause of actions [or] act to suffi-
ciently limit discovery.  By freely granting motions to con-
tinue, they allow the cases to drag on for years . . . .96
Thus, patent trolls may not necessarily be bad actors deserving
of punishment, such as fee-shifting, but may simply be rational
actors taking advantage of inefficiencies in the civil litigation
and patent systems.97
II
FEE RECOVERY UNDER THE PATENT ACT: DEFINING AN
“EXCEPTIONAL CASE”
The Patent Act’s fee-shifting provision provides, in its total-
ity: “The court in exceptional cases may award reasonable at-
torney fees to the prevailing party.”98  By providing this rule
without substantial qualification, Congress granted the judici-
ary seemingly broad discretion in determining when such
awards are appropriate.  Indeed, legislative history reveals that
Congress added “in exceptional cases” in order to codify how
the courts had interpreted a predecessor statute.99  In this
Part, I detail the recent history of fee-shifting in patent cases:
subpart A discusses the former standard for section 285 fee
awards, and subpart B discusses the Supreme Court’s recent
95 INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. LEGAL SYS., supra note 55, at 19. R
96 Id. (alterations in original).
97 See John M. Golden, Litigation in the Middle: The Context of Patent-Infringe-
ment Injunctions, 92 TEX. L. REV. 2075, 2079 (2014) (“Of course, one can question
the extent to which a rational profit-maximizer model . . . will successfully predict
litigation-related behavior.  Regardless of the validity of such questions, however,
such models seem commonly to inform intuitions about when litigation or settle-
ment is likely to occur in a commercial context like a typical patent-infringement
dispute.”).
98 35 U.S.C. § 285 (2012).
99 See S. REP NO. 82-1979, at 30 (1952) (providing that section 285 is “sub-
stantially the same as” its predecessor, but that “ ‘in exceptional cases’ has been
added as expressing the intention of the present statute as shown by its legislative
history and as interpreted by the courts”).
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liberalization of district courts’ discretion to award fees in pat-
ent cases.
A. The Former Federal Circuit Standard: Brooks Furniture
Before Octane Fitness, the Federal Circuit established the
governing standard for section 285 fee awards in Brooks Furni-
ture Manufacturing, Inc. v. Dutailier International, Inc., which
bifurcated “exceptional case[s]” into two distinct categories.100
In the first category, a party engaged in misconduct that was
either related to the merits of the underlying claim or patent,
“such as willful infringement, fraud or inequitable conduct in
procuring the patent,”101 or alternatively, misconduct related
to the course of litigation, such as “vexatious or unjustified
litigation, conduct that violates Fed.R.Civ.P. 11, or like infrac-
tions.”102  Despite Justice Sotomayor’s criticism in Octane Fit-
ness that this category involved “largely . . . independently
sanctionable conduct,”103 by bringing willful infringement and
misconduct involved in patent prosecution within the purview
of a section 285 award, this category did provide grounds for
fee awards specific to patent litigation.104
The second category did not involve such blatant miscon-
duct but allowed courts to award fees “if both (1) the litigation
[was] brought in subjective bad faith, and (2) the litigation [was]
objectively baseless.”105  This category required courts not only
to assess the mental state of a party at the time of filing an
infringement action but also the merits of that party’s claim.106
By so requiring, the Federal Circuit sufficiently cabined the
threshold for awarding fees for potentially frivolous infringe-
ment suits in light of the technical difficulty of assessing the
merits of an infringement action.107  The burden of proof that
the Federal Circuit imposed on a party moving for fees, that of
“clear and convincing evidence,”108 also reflected this appropri-




103 Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1749, 1756
(2014).
104 See id. at 1756–57.
105 Id. at 1754 (citing Brooks Furniture, 393 F.3d at 1381).
106 See Brooks Furniture, 393 F.3d at 1382.
107 See id. at 1384 (“Infringement is often difficult to determine, and a paten-
tee’s ultimately incorrect view of how a court will find does not of itself establish
bad faith.”).
108 Id.
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ately conservative approach.109  As a result, this definition of
an exceptional case proved to be a high bar for fee awards.110
B. The Supreme Court Speaks: Octane Fitness and
Highmark
1. Octane Fitness
The Supreme Court substantially lowered section 285’s
standard in Octane Fitness, overruling Brooks Furniture and
defining an exceptional case as “simply one that stands out
from others with respect to the substantive strength of a party’s
litigating position (considering both the governing law and the
facts of the case) or the unreasonable manner in which the case
was litigated.”111  Thus, litigants can now prove that a case is
exceptional without showing sanction-worthy conduct or satis-
fying both the subjective bad faith and objective baselessness
prongs.112  Rather, the new standard is permeable, allowing
trial courts to award fees based upon “a simple discretionary
inquiry.”113  Furthermore, the Court held that the party moving
for fees need not meet the more demanding clear and convinc-
ing evidence standard espoused in Brooks Furniture, but only
need prove entitlement to a fee award by “a preponderance of
the evidence.”114
In applying the Octane Fitness standard, district courts
may now rest their determination that a case warrants a fee
award by relying on factors including, but not limited to, “frivo-
lousness, motivation, objective unreasonableness (both in the
factual and legal components of the case) and the need in par-
ticular circumstances to advance considerations of compensa-
tion and deterrence.”115  These factors, and particularly the
final two, reveal the role that fee awards will serve under Oc-
109 Id. at 1382.
110 Nemec & Rifai-Bashjawish, supra note 8, at 3, (estimating that only one
percent of prevailing parties recovered attorney’s fees under Brooks Furniture); see
also Daniel Roth, Patent Litigation Attorneys’ Fees: Shifting from Status to Con-
duct, 13 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 257, 269 (2013) (noting that, under Brooks
Furniture, “[d]espite defendants’ growing desire to use fee-shifting to recoup costs
and deter future abusive litigation, it [was] difficult for litigants to meet the ‘excep-
tional case’ standard for fee-shifting under the Patent Statute”).
111 Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1749, 1756
(2014).
112 Id. at 1757 (“[A] district court may award fees in the rare case in which a
party’s unreasonable conduct—while not necessarily independently sanction-
able—is nonetheless so ‘exceptional’ as to justify an award of fees.”).
113 Id. at 1758.
114 Id.
115 Id. at 1756 n.6 (quoting Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 534 n.19
(1994)).
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tane Fitness: as a mechanism for punishment and deter-
rence.116  Indeed, the Court allowed trial courts to impose fee
awards based on the mere potential that doing so might deter
patent litigation tactics that a litigant could regard as abusive,
and to compensate alleged victims of such abusive practices for
expenses that would not have been incurred but for an adver-
sary’s misconduct.117  Thus, Octane Fitness’s rationale typifies
a punitive fee-shifting rule.118
2. Highmark
The standard of review that an appellate court must apply
to a trial court’s decision dictates the extent to which the appel-
late court may second-guess the trial court’s determination,
and often dictates the outcome of an appeal itself.119  On one
hand, an appellate court generally applies a de novo standard
of review to questions of law, and in doing so does not grant a
trial court any discretion; essentially the appellate court views
the case as if it sat as the trial court in the first instance.120  On
the other hand, an appellate court generally applies an abuse
of discretion standard to decisions that the judicial system en-
trusts to a trial court, which typically include evidentiary and
procedural decisions.121  Although the formulation of this
highly deferential standard differs substantially across sub-
stantive areas of law, suffice to say that it is a very difficult
standard for an appellant to prevail under.122
While lowering the threshold of finding an exceptional case
under section 285, in Highmark Inc. v. Allcare Health Manage-
ment Systems, Inc., the Court also heightened the standard of
review that the Federal Circuit must apply to section 285 fee
awards.123  Interpreting the issue of whether a case was objec-
tively baseless as “a question of law based on underlying mixed
questions of law and fact,”124 the Federal Circuit had applied a
116 Id.
117 See supra section I.A.1.
118 See supra section I.A.3.
119 See Patricia M. Wald, The Rhetoric of Results and the Results of Rhetoric:
Judicial Writings, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1371, 1391 (1995).
120 See Amanda Peters, The Meaning, Measure, and Misuse of Standards of
Review, 13 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 233, 243–46 (2009).
121 See Robert Anderson IV, Law, Fact, and Discretion in the Federal Courts: An
Empirical Study, 2012 UTAH L. REV. 1, 8–9.
122 See Peters, supra note 120, at 244–45. R
123 See Highmark Inc. v. Allcare Health Mgmt. Sys., Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1744,
1748–49 (2014).
124 Id. at 1747.
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de novo standard of review to fee-award rulings.125  Because
Octane Fitness made such determinations matters of district
court discretion, however, the Court reversed, holding that the
Federal Circuit, which maintains exclusive jurisdiction over
patent appeals,126 may only review section 285 fee awards for
an abuse of discretion.127  The Court reasoned that a trial court
was “better positioned to decide whether a case is exceptional
. . . because it lives with the case over a prolonged period of
time,”128 and “[a]lthough questions of law may in some cases be
relevant to the § 285 inquiry, that inquiry generally is, at heart,
‘rooted in factual determinations.’”129  Thus, the Court inverted
the standard of review applicable to section 285 fee awards by
removing the broad discretion that the Federal Circuit previ-
ously enjoyed.
3. In Sum
Though both the Brooks Furniture and Octane Fitness stan-
dards did not aim to award fees as a matter of course, Octane
Fitness’s more permissive standard will likely result in more
frequent awards.  Without an established body of caselaw,
however, courts have not driven a stake on either side of the
fee-shifting fence.  Indeed, as a judge in one of the nation’s
most popular patent litigation districts put it, “[t]he belt got
loosened a bit.  The question is whether it’s one notch, two or
more.”130  While some courts have adopted an expansive inter-
pretation of the Octane Fitness standard, going so far as to
apply the standard to identical fee-shifting provisions outside
of patent disputes,131 others have been hesitant to find excep-
tional cases warranting awards.132  Given the abuse of discre-
125 Highmark, Inc. v. Allcare Health Mgmt. Sys., Inc., 687 F.3d 1300, 1309
(Fed. Cir. 2012), vacated, 134 S. Ct. 1744 (2014).
126 See infra Part III.D.
127 Highmark, 134 S. Ct. at 1748.
128 Id. (citation and internal quotation mark omitted).
129 Id. at 1749 (emphasis added) (citing Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496
U.S. 384, 401 (1990)).
130 Graham, supra note 41, at 3 (quoting the Hon. Paul S. Grewal, Magistrate R
Judge, Northern District of California).
131 See, e.g., Fair Wind Sailing, Inc. v. Dempster, 764 F.3d 303, 315 (3d Cir.
2014) (applying Octane Fitness standard to Lanham Act’s fee-shifting provision,
which is identical to section 285, and affirming award).
132 Compare Gametek LLC v. Zynga Inc., No. CV 13-2546 RS, 2014 WL
4351414, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 2, 2014) (denying motion for fee award because
“the ‘exceptional’ label is not warranted here even under the more expansive
[Octane Fitness] standard”), and Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., No
11–CV–01846-LHK, 2014 WL 4145499, at *7, *11 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 20, 2014) (deny-
ing motion for award despite jury’s finding of willful infringement), with Summit
Data Sys., LLC v. EMC Corp., No. CV 10–749–GMS, 2014 WL 4955689, at *1, *4
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tion standard now applicable to such awards per Highmark,
however, courts will likely continue to award fees
idiosyncratically.133
III
ANALYSIS: THE COSTS OF THE OCTANE FITNESS-HIGHMARK
FRAMEWORK
Although Octane Fitness and Highmark purported to dis-
courage abusive patent litigation, these rulings could exacer-
bate the very problems they seek to remedy.  In this Part, I call
attention to the flaws in the Octane Fitness-Highmark frame-
work: subpart A explains that district courts and litigants will
not easily be able to apply the Octane Fitness standard; sub-
part B posits that the framework will likely increase litigation
costs and deter settlement; subpart C argues that fee-shifting
will have a chilling effect on patent enforcement; and subpart D
points out the problems that will result from lessening the
Federal Circuit’s role in interpreting and applying section 285.
A. Difficulty in Application
In order to make a victim of abusive patent litigation whole,
a patent litigant must be identifiable as a “victim,”134 which
under Octane Fitness means essentially that such party’s op-
ponent maintained a substantively weak litigation position or
litigated the case unreasonably.135  Furthermore, under
Highmark, the Federal Circuit will have less opportunity to sec-
ond-guess a district court’s determination that a case was ex-
ceptional for purposes of a fee award.136  Thus, while district
courts were able before Octane Fitness to award fees against
patent litigants for misconduct or frivolous claims that they
(awarding fees under section 285 after voluntary dismissal for, inter alia, paten-
tee’s “practice of extracting settlements worth a fraction of what the case would
cost to litigate”).
133 Moreover, an empirical study suggests the somewhat counterintuitive con-
clusion that ideological differences between the trial and appellate level increase
the level of deference that federal appellate courts grant to district courts. See
Anderson IV, supra note 121, at 31. R
134 Cf. Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Howard F. Chang, An Analysis of Fee Shifting
Based on the Margin of Victory: On Frivolous Suits, Meritorious Suits, and the Role
of Rule 11, 25 J. LEGAL STUD., 371, 377 (1996) (asserting that, under “classic
fee-shifting rules . . . fee shifting, to the extent that it occurs, depends only on the
identity of the winning party”).
135 See supra note 111 and accompanying text. R
136 See supra section II.B.2.
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knew would not succeed,137 the current framework enables
district courts to discretionarily award fees based on a ruling
that the merits of a claim are substantively weak, regardless of
whether the party alleging infringement viewed, or even was
able to view, its claim as substantively weak.138
This framework poses pragmatic difficulties for district
courts because patent cases involve inherently complex and
complicated facts that both judges and juries may have trouble
deciphering.  Indeed, as the Federal Circuit noted in Brooks
Furniture, determining the strength of a patent infringement
claim is typically quite difficult,139 and particularly so before
the parties undertake discovery.140  Thus, determining whether
an alleged patent infringer was a victim of the litigation may be
difficult if a district court is unable to determine whether a
litigant was maintaining unreasonable litigating positions,141
especially with less oversight from the Federal Circuit.  By the
same token, litigants themselves will have trouble applying the
doctrine and determining whether they are maintaining unrea-
sonable positions, especially given the idiosyncratic fashion in
which district courts will likely award fees under the new
regime.142
B. Increasing Litigation Costs and Deterring Settlement
Despite the criticism that litigants may use the potential
costs of patent litigation as leverage for settlements, settlement
in itself is not deleterious in patent disputes, and often results
in win-win resolutions between the parties involved and poten-
tially increases the efficiency of the patent system as a
137 See supra subpart II.A.  Courts may also sanction patent litigants for mis-
conduct in patent litigation under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  See, e.g.,
Raylon, LLC v. Complus Data Innovations, Inc., 700 F.3d 1361, 1368 (Fed. Cir.
2012) (holding that frivolous claim constructions that are “so unreasonable that
no reasonable litigant could believe it would succeed” may warrant sanctions
under Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 (quoting iLor, LLC v. Google, Inc., 631 F.3d 1372, 1378
(Fed. Cir. 2011))).
138 See Brooks Furniture Mfg., Inc. v. Dutailier Int’l, Inc., 393 F.3d 1378, 1382
(Fed. Cir. 2005).
139 See supra note 107 and accompanying text. R
140 See Brooks Furniture, 393 F.3d at 1384.
141 See Liang & Berliner, supra note 40, at 68 (“The technical and legal com- R
plexity of patent cases makes it difficult to decide who is the prevailing party that
should be made whole.  Many cases are close calls, and patent laws are relatively
volatile as compared to other areas of law.”).
142 See id. at 107–08 (arguing against a theory that fee-shifting should lead to
less infringement claims because “[t]echnology products are complex and claim
language is often difficult to parse.  It is costly and difficult for a company to
determine when it is infringing a patent”).
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\101-3\CRN305.txt unknown Seq: 24 16-MAR-16 15:48
836 CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 101:813
whole.143  Indeed, “businesspeople overwhelmingly prefer set-
tlement and licensing to litigation” because of the cost savings
settlement entails, and, more importantly, because alternative
resolution may more accurately assess the merits of an under-
lying claim and result in outcomes that are unavailable
through litigation.144  A particular benefit of settlement in pat-
ent disputes is that patentees and alleged infringers may enter
licensing agreements that allow an alleged infringer to continue
using an invention, which not only avoids litigation costs but
also increases a patent’s value if the patent may not have gen-
erated as much revenue solely in the patentee’s hands or if the
alleged infringer can use the invention at lower costs than the
patentee.145
Liberalized fee-shifting, however, will likely disincentivize
settlement.146  Indeed, an increased likelihood of an adverse fee
award coupled with a decreased ability to challenge such
award on appeal will no doubt raise the stakes at the trial level,
incentivizing patent litigants to fight even harder and expend
more resources at trial.147  In turn, the Octane Fit-
ness-Highmark framework will likely increase litigation costs
that a patentee may use as leverage to extract a meritless set-
tlement or, conversely, decrease the parties’ willingness to set-
tle.  For instance, a patentee who foresees an adverse fee award
after a loss or voluntary dismissal might therefore avoid settle-
ment and see the case through trial, taking its chances with a
jury, with little reason to litigate with an eye toward saving
costs.148  Although this could incentivize settlement on the part
of the alleged infringer,149 sunken defense costs could just as
easily put that party in a position to take its chances at trial as
well.  Indeed, one court noted that “[a]warding fees based on a
pattern of negotiating early, low-value settlements could tell
143 See Mark A. Lemley, Reconceiving Patents in the Age of Venture Capital, 4 J.
SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 137, 147–48 (2000) (discussing the effects of patent
transactions in private markets).
144 SCHLICHER, supra note 54, at xviii. R
145 Id. at 5.
146 See Liang & Berliner, supra note 40, at 93–100. R
147 See David Herr & Steve Baicker-McKee, Recovery of Attorneys’ Fees in
Patent Litigation, FED. LITIGATOR, June 2014, at 169, 169.
148 See SCHLICHER, supra note 54, at 58 (“[I]f the patent owner believes that it is R
certain to be awarded attorneys’ fees if it wins, it will not settle to avoid future fees.
Indeed, the patent owner may litigate rather than settle merely to obtain an award
of its fees.”  Even in the absence of such certainty, “[i]f there is some probability
that the patent owner will receive attorneys’ fees, it becomes less sensitive to fees
in some proportion to the likelihood of the award.”).
149 Id. (“If the infringer believes it will have to pay fees, it will have a powerful
incentive to settle to save those costs.”).
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plaintiffs ‘they have less reason to settle, not more.’”150  And
even if parties consider settling, fee awards may complicate
litigants’ assessment of a case’s value because either party’s
fees become an additional tier of dispute, and the parties must
not only analyze the merits and remedies of the suit, but also
the probability and amount of a fee award.151
C. Chilling Patent Enforcement
The justifications underlying traditional property law and
intellectual property law differ considerably in some areas.  For
instance, property law traditionally governs goods that are in-
herently exhaustible, while intellectual property law governs
inexhaustible goods.152  Nevertheless, by creating private own-
ership rights for ideas that entail the right to exclude others
from using a patented idea, intellectual property law achieves
much the same objectives of traditional property law.153  In-
deed, as economist Harold Demsetz elucidated, “[a] primary
function of property rights is that of guiding incentives to
achieve a greater internalization of externalities. . . .  One con-
dition is necessary to make costs and benefits externalities.
The cost of a transaction in the rights between the parties
(internalization) must exceed the gains from internaliza-
tion.”154  In much the same vein, Demsetz provided what is now
the prevailing justification for patents155 by arguing that pat-
ents allow inventors to appropriate privately created informa-
tion, and that “[a]ppropriability is largely a matter of legal
arrangements and the enforcement of these arrangements. . . .
150 Graham, supra note 41, at 3.  The Federal Circuit vacated the court’s R
original decision in this case denying attorney fees under the Patent Act after
Octane Fitness.  See Site Update Solutions, LLC v. Accor N. Am., Inc., No. 11-3306
PSG, 2013 WL 2238626 (N.D. Cal. May 21, 2013), vacated, 556 F. App’x 962 (Fed.
Cir. 2014).
151 SCHLICHER, supra note 54, at 58. R
152 Amie N. Broader, Note, Comparing Apples to APPLs: Importing the Doctrine
of Adverse Possession in Real Property to Patent Law, 2 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 557,
560 (2007) (citing Lawrence Lessig, The Law of the Horse: What Cyberlaw Might
Teach, 113 HARV. L. REV. 501, 526 (1999)).
153 See Edwards Lifesciences AG v. CoreValve, Inc., 699 F.3d 1305, 1314 (Fed.
Cir. 2012) (“A patentee’s right to exclude is a fundamental tenet of patent law.”
(citing Richardson v. Suzuki Motor Co., 868 F.2d 1226, 1247 (Fed. Cir. 1989)));
Robert P. Merges, On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REV.
839, 845 (1990) (noting that patents are “[a]nalogous to the metes and bounds of a
real property deed, [and] they distinguish the inventor’s intellectual property from
the surrounding terrain”).
154 See Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON.
REV. 347, 348 (1967).
155 See Amy Kapczynski & Talha Syed, Essay, The Continuum of Excludability
and the Limits of Patents, 122 YALE L.J. 1900, 1904 (2013).
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The degree to which knowledge is privately appropriable can be
increased by raising the penalties for patent violations and by
increasing resources for policing patent violations.”156  Thus,
synthesizing Demsetz’s two theories, a patent is essentially val-
uable because it grants a patentee the right to enforce the
patent, exclude potential competitors from practicing the pat-
ent, and thereby internalize gains that a competing user of the
invention would otherwise enjoy.157
Following Demsetz’s propositions, a regime that decreases
the likelihood of patent enforcement not only undermines the
central justifications of awarding patents, but also decreases
the monetary value of individual patents.  Patent enforcement
depends upon private litigants that must balance the likelihood
and benefits of success against the potential costs of defeat;158
fee-shifting regimes alter this calculation by making the costs
of defeat much higher.  Proponents of fee-shifting regimes in
patent disputes argue, of course, that this is exactly the point:
fee-shifting chills patentees from bringing frivolous suits or
from using the prospective costs of litigation against alleged
infringers to obtain settlements or other pecuniary benefits.159
What such arguments fail to address, however, is that fee-
shifting has the same ex ante effect on cost calculation for
patent trolls as it does for smaller firms, inventors, and other
parties that may otherwise have novel or meritorious claims,
but may not have sufficient resources or risk tolerance to pur-
156 Harold Demsetz, Information and Efficiency: Another Viewpoint, 12 J.L. &
ECON. 1, 9–11 (1969).
157 See F. Scott Kieff, Property Rights and Property Rules for Commercializing
Inventions, 85 MINN. L. REV. 697, 717 (2001) (“The creation of a property right to
exclude others from partaking in the benefits of commercialization efforts is con-
sistent with the basic thesis of Demsetz that property rights emerge when it
becomes economically efficient to internalize benefits and costs.”).  Whether such
internalization is normatively desirable is beyond the purview of this Note.  For a
more comprehensive discussion and a dissenting opinion on the subject, see
Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 83 TEX. L. REV.
1031, 1032 (2005) (“[T]he effort to permit inventors to capture the full social value
of their invention—and the rhetoric of free riding in intellectual property more
generally—are fundamentally misguided.”).
158 See Kelly T. Murphy, The Changing Tide of Patentability Standards and
Filing Timelines for Biotechnologies, in THE IMPACT OF RECENT PATENT LAW CASES AND
DEVELOPMENTS (2013 ed. 8012) 2011 WL 6742515 at *1 (“The decision to enforce or
invalidate a patent must involve weighing the benefits and costs of
litigation . . . .”).
159 See, e.g., Steven Seidenberg, Troll Alert: Federal Circuit Gets Reined in over
Patent Fees in Infringement Suits, 100 A.B.A. J. 19, 19 (2014) (noting that “ac-
cused infringers have a strong incentive to fight back because their legal costs
may be paid by overly aggressive patentees”).
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sue litigation.160  Such risk-averse patentees must now take
into account the increased likelihood of a fee award under Oc-
tane Fitness but will likely be unable to do so accurately given
the unpredictability that Highmark injects into the calcula-
tion.161  This difficult and inexact calculation is thus likely to
chill otherwise meritorious claims by the most deserving of
patent enforcement—individual inventors and small firms that
are responsible for much of American innovation.162
D. Decreasing the Federal Circuit’s Role
In 1982, Congress passed the Federal Courts Improvement
Act, which fused the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals with
the Court of Claims, forming the Unites States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit.163  In doing so, Congress vested the
Federal Circuit with exclusive appellate jurisdiction over patent
suits, the driving factors in this decision being uniformity in
patent law, reduced forum shopping, and enhanced predict-
ability of the strength of a given patent.164  Indeed, before 1982,
circuit courts diverged broadly on, and the Supreme Court did
not often issue decisions regarding, patent law, collectively
leaving patent law in a state of uncertainty and disrepair.165
The Federal Circuit swiftly and substantially broadened
the rights of patentees, thereby vastly expanding the value of
intellectual property rights.166  Today, the Federal Circuit plays
a crucial role in patent cases, reversing approximately thirty to
160 See Matthew Sag & Kurt Rohde, Patent Reform and Differential Impact, 8
MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 1, 67 (2007) (“[F]ee-shifting is only effective if patent
holders have the resources to pay an award of costs. . . . [And] the prospect of fee-
shifting may have a chilling effect on the assertion of good patents held by risk-
averse entities.”).
161 See supra section II.B.2.
162 See generally Jeff A. Ronspies, Comment, Does David Need a New Sling?
Small Entities Face a Costly Barrier to Patent Protection, 4 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL.
PROP. L. 184, 192–94 (2004) (discussing the contributions of small entities in the
American patent system).
163 See Brian H. Redmond, Annotation, Jurisdiction of the United States Court
of Appeals for Federal Circuit Under 28 U.S.C.A. § 1292 and 1295, 97 A.L.R. Fed.
694, § 2[a] (1990).
164 See Larry D. Thompson, Jr., Adrift on a Sea of Uncertainty: Preserving
Uniformity in Patent Law Post-Vornado Through Deference to the Federal Circuit,
92 GEO. L.J. 523, 532–33 (2004).
165 See JAFFE & LERNER, supra note 93, at 98–100. R
166 See id. at 104–05 (noting that “[w]hereas the circuit courts had affirmed 62
percent of district-court findings of patent infringement in the three decades
before the creation of the [Federal Circuit], the [Federal Circuit] in its first eight
years affirmed 90 percent of such decisions,” and “when the district court had
found that a patent was invalid or not infringed . . . the circuits had reversed only
12 percent of the cases,” while “[i]n the first eight years of the Federal Circuit, 28
percent of these cases were reversed”).
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forty percent of all appeals to the Federal Circuit.167  With pre-
siding judges experienced in patent law, law clerks with techni-
cal backgrounds, and technically trained assistants, the
Federal Circuit rules over patent appeals with a necessarily
heightened degree of expertise.168
Against this backdrop, the flaw in Highmark’s holding—
allowing the Federal Circuit to overturn a fee award only if it is
an abuse of discretion169—becomes immediately apparent.
Specifically, contrary to the Court’s view, the standard of re-
view applicable to section 285 fee awards should allow the
Federal Circuit substantial leeway to second-guess such a rul-
ing.  Two factors highlight this problem.  The first is that under
Octane Fitness, district courts may award fees based on the
weakness of a party’s claim “considering both the governing
law and the facts of the case.”170  Doctrinally, the Federal Cir-
cuit should at least be entitled to review such decisions under a
de novo standard because they involve questions of law.171  But
more substantively, Congress created the Federal Circuit ex-
actly for the purpose of second-guessing such determinations
given the Federal Circuit’s expertise and specialization.172  A
second factor highlighting Highmark’s fault is the amount of
money that may be at stake.  Simply put, given the potential
fees that go into litigating a patent case,173 an award (or lack
thereof) based on a faulty analysis could prove to be the death
knell for one party and a windfall for another.
IV
PROPOSALS: INTERNALIZING EXTERNAL COSTS
If America is serious about putting an end to abuses of the
patent system and the civil litigation system at large,
lawmakers and the courts should favor systemic reform rather
than post-hoc remedial measures.  In this Part, I propose three
reforms that would serve this goal.  Subpart A provides the
normative goal behind these proposals: internalizing the patent
167 Liang & Berliner, supra note 40, at 68–69. R
168 See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Case Study in Special-
ized Courts, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 4–5, 5 n.29 (1989).
169 Highmark, Inc. v. Allcare Health Mgmt. Sys., Inc., 687 F.3d 1300, 1320
(2012).
170 Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1749, 1756
(2014).
171 See supra Part II.B.2.
172 See Dreyfuss, supra note 168, at 6–8. R
173 Indeed, Highmark itself exemplifies this potential magnitude: the district
court in that case awarded $4,694,727.40 in attorneys’ fees and $209,626.56 in
expenses. See Highmark, 687 F.3d at 1308.
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system’s otherwise external costs; subpart B proposes reforms
to the patent system; and subpart C proposes an option for civil
litigation reform within the realm of e-discovery.
A. Normative Goals: Internalization
The rationale that Octane Fitness and Highmark implicitly
espouse reflects the rationale that Demsetz purported under-
lies all property law: internalizing externalities.174  However,
the resulting framework for awarding fees in patent disputes
will not likely realize this objective.  Essentially, this implicit
rationale is that by liberalizing fee-shifting in patent litigation,
courts may force patent trolls to internalize costs that they
impose on their adversaries.  In other words, the central objec-
tion to abusive patent litigation is that it unfairly creates litiga-
tion costs for parties that would not otherwise suffer such
expenses; potentially shifting these costs to the party that cre-
ates them will therefore—in theory—either make the victim of
the abusive litigation financially whole or deter the abusive
litigant from suing in the first instance.175
The foundational flaws in the Octane Fitness-Highmark
framework176 require alternative measures in order to achieve
the ultimate goal of internalizing the external costs of abusive
patent litigation.  Specifically, I propose three reforms that have
the potential to extinguish abusive patent litigation.  The first
two proposals seek to prevent patent litigation by increasing
efficiency in patent acquisition and assuring the validity of is-
sued patents.  The third proposal seeks to limit the costs of
e-discovery by adopting an approach that the Federal Circuit
has advocated.  The following proposals are based upon the
premise that, in order to reduce patent trolling, reform should
seek to eliminate systemic flaws, rather than adopting post
hoc, reactionary countermeasures such as fee-shifting that tar-
get particular litigants rather than the inefficiencies that such
litigants take advantage of.
B. Systemic Patent Reform: Preventing Abusive Patent
Litigation
In order to obtain a patent, an invention must pass the
PTO’s standards of utility, novelty, and nonobviousness.177
Furthermore, the language of a patent must be sufficiently defi-
174 See supra notes 154–156 and accompanying text. R
175 See Rowe, Jr., supra note 17, at 657–61. R
176 See supra Part III.
177 See United States v. Adams, 383 U.S. 39, 48 (1966).
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nite to set a claimed invention apart from others.178  In recent
history, however, the PTO has been infamously permissive in
awarding patents, resulting in “bad patents” that are overly
broad or otherwise should not have issued.179  Bad patents
pose major problems to the integrity of the current patent sys-
tem and often form the basis of a patent troll’s infringement
claim.180  The tendency to conflate the bad patent dilemma
with patent trolling, however, is another example of blaming
patent trolls for larger systemic issues; indeed, practicing and
nonpracticing entities alike may assert bad patents against
alleged infringers.181  For example, the well-known jam and
jelly manufacturer J. M. Smucker Co. once sued a small Michi-
gan grocer for infringing on Smucker’s patent for a “sealed
crustless sandwich.”182
Litigation over bad patents transfers the costs of the PTO’s
faulty issuance to potential infringers in the form of legal ex-
penses and increased research and development.183  These
costs are therefore negative externalities of the patent system.
Such externalities are avoidable, however, if the PTO denies a
low quality patent application in the first instance or invali-
178 See Interval Licensing, LLC v. AOL, Inc., 766 F.3d 1364, 1369 (Fed. Cir.
2014) (“A patent must ‘conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing out
and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the applicant regards as [the]
invention.’” (alteration in original) (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006))).
179 Examples of bad patents include “obvious inventions like the crustless
peanut butter and jelly sandwich, ridiculous ideas like a method of exercising a
cat with a laser pointer, and impossible concepts like traveling faster than the
speed of light.”  Mark Lemley et al., What to Do About Bad Patents?, REG., Winter
2005-2006, at 10, 10.
180 Indeed, one economist found that fifty-nine percent of patents that patent
trolls assert would be at least partially invalidated if subject to anticipation or
obviousness decisions before issuance. See Shawn P. Miller, Where’s the Innova-
tion?: An Analysis of the Quantity and Qualities of Anticipated and Obvious Pat-
ents, 18 VA. J.L. & TECH. 1, 5–7 (2013).
181 See McDonough III, supra note 10, at 202; see also Jason Rantanen,
Slaying the Troll: Litigation as an Effective Strategy Against Patent Threats, 23
SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 159, 167 (2006) (“[T]he concept of ‘bad’
patents and that of patent trolls should be kept separate.  While patent trolls may
tend to use overlooked or older patents, it is a stretch to say that they are driving
the creation of bad patents, or that ‘patent trolling’ is equivalent to enforcing bad
patents.”).
182 See JAFFE & LERNER, supra note 93, at 25–26, 32–34. R
183 See Jay P. Kesan & Andres A. Gallo, Why “Bad” Patents Survive in the
Market and How Should We Change?—The Private and Social Costs of Patents, 55
EMORY L.J. 61, 77 (2006) (“The existence of a ‘bad’ patent, unless challenged
successfully, creates a private cost: firms have to pay licensing fees to use the
technology, and consumers have to pay higher prices to buy the patentee’s prod-
ucts.  A ‘bad’ patent also creates a social cost: the sum of all the private costs plus
the externalities over the investment processes of competing firms.”).
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dates a bad patent early in its lifespan.184  Although Congress
and the courts have recently taken substantial steps to remedy
these issues, such reform does not adequately assure patent
quality.  Ultimately, Congress, courts, and the PTO should fo-
cus their energy toward issuing quality patents rather than
attempting to punish patent trolling after the fact.
1. Limiting Bad Patent Issuance
Issuing bad patents has produced a “vicious cycle” that
invites poorly conceived patent applications in greater
amounts, thereby overwhelming the PTO’s patent examiners
and causing them to issue even more patents that do not meet
the requirements of utility, novelty, and nonobviousness.185  As
the PTO currently operates, examiners are strapped for time,
spending approximately sixteen to seventeen hours over three
to four years on each application.186  Examiners also suffer
from a deficit of adequate research resources, which exacer-
bates their time constraints.187  Furthermore, examiners’ com-
pensation is tied to the amount of applications awarded or
rejected, and because applicants may alter or appeal rejected
patents, examiners have a financial incentive to err on the side
of awarding patents and to do so swiftly.188
To add to examiners’ pressures, applicants have an incen-
tive to draft vague patent claims that may be read narrowly
during examination to avoid rejection but expansively in litiga-
tion to prove infringement.189  In response to this incentive, the
Supreme Court recently lowered the standard for invalidating
patents for indefiniteness, rendering a patent invalid if its
claims fail to “inform those skilled in the art about the scope of
the invention with reasonable certainty.”190  Despite this new
184 See Miller, supra note 180, at 27 (“If justified by the costs non-innovative R
patents impose, the most effective reforms may increase the ability of potential
infringers to challenge the validity of claimed ideas during the application process
or at least prior to litigation.”).
185 JAFFE & LERNER, supra note 93, at 175–76. R
186 Doug Lichtman & Mark A. Lemley, Rethinking Patent Law’s Presumption of
Validity, 60 STAN. L. REV. 45, 53 (2007).
187 See Justin Pats, Preventing the Issuance of “Bad” Patents: How the PTO
Can Supplement its Practices and Procedures to Assure Quality, 48 IDEA 409, 414
(2008).
188 See JAFFE & LERNER, supra note 93, at 136. R
189 BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 94, at 57. R
190 Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2120, 2128–29 (2014)
(“[T]he definiteness requirement must take into account the inherent limitations
of language”; however, “patent applicants face powerful incentives to inject ambi-
guity into their claims.”).  The previous standard of definiteness rendered a claim
invalid “only when it is ‘not amenable to construction’ or ‘insolubly ambiguous.’”
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standard, a number of Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB)
decisions reveal that claims with broad language will likely still
survive indefiniteness review, at least before patentees litigate
such claims in court.191
Although demanding greater patent quality from the PTO
would invariably require greater resources, doing so would
lessen the amount of bad patents issued, which ultimately
waste even greater resources in the courts.192  Nonetheless,
some argue that operating the PTO under stricter standards
would require an investment that would largely go to waste
because only a fraction of all issued patents actually become
valuable and thus litigated.193  However, applying stricter stan-
dards that would require more adequate examination (and
frankly, more money) would reverse the “vicious cycle” of bad
patents by incentivizing applicants to expend more resources
on drafting higher quality applications, or not applying at
all.194  Furthermore, more exacting patent examination would
force applicants to internalize at least a portion of the costs of
bad patents and would also free resources at the PTO to rein-
vest in quality examinations because of a reciprocal decrease in
patent applications.195
A pattern of patent issuance producing fewer patents of
higher quality would also beneficially impact abusive patent
litigation.  Specifically, patents that ultimately become involved
in disputes would contain more deftly drafted claims that
courts would be able to interpret more efficiently.196  Indeed,
Id. at 2127 (quoting Biosig Instruments, Inc. v. Nautilus, Inc., 715 F.3d 891, 898
(Fed. Cir. 2013) (citation omitted)).
191 See, e.g., Ex parte Oliver, No. 2012-005758, 2014 WL 5490441, at *2
(P.T.A.B. Oct. 29, 2014) (overturning an examiner’s finding of indefiniteness be-
cause a claim that “provid[es] many preferences to [a] user . . . only indicates
breadth of the recited feature” rather than indefiniteness); Zodiac Pool Sys. Inc. v.
Aqua Prods. Inc., No. 2013-00159 (P.T.A.B. Aug. 22, 2014) (rejecting indefinite-
ness arguments and noting that a patentee’s “claim may be broad in scope, but
the breadth of a claim is not to be equated with indefiniteness”).
192 See BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 94, at 16–19 (attributing the rise in R
patent litigation to low quality patents that are “vaguely worded, overly abstract,
[and] of uncertain scope”); see also JAFFE & LERNER, supra note 93, at 175 (arguing R
that “it would be inefficient to provide thorough examination for all applications at
the current rate of patent application,” but “while the out-of-pocket cost of litiga-
tion may be tolerable, the intangible cost of a system with pervasive low-quality
patents is much higher than just the cost of paying lawyers to file and defend
patent cases”).
193 See Lemley, Lichtman & Sampat, supra note 179, at 12. R
194 See JAFFE & LERNER, supra note 93, at 176. R
195 See id.
196 See Dargaye Churnet, Patent Claims Revisited, 11 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL.
PROP. 501, 507 (2013) (“[U]nder the current system, many bad patents are
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more efficient and predictable claim construction at the district
court level would likely decrease expenditure on claim con-
struction at the appellate level as well.197  Furthermore, a court
would be less likely to invalidate such patents, which would
make the outcome of a given case more predictable ex ante.198
In turn, this would increase the likelihood of pretrial disposi-
tion, thereby decreasing litigation costs and lessening patent
trolls’ leverage for extracting settlements.199
2. Invalidating Bad Patents
After the PTO awards a patent, the patent enjoys a pre-
sumption of validity, which places the burden on a party chal-
lenging the patent in court to provide “clear and convincing”
evidence that the PTO should not have issued the patent, and
that the patent is therefore invalid.200  Congress created ex
parte reexamination to allow patentees or third parties to re-
quest that the PTO review a patent’s validity; however, this
procedure suffers from a number of defects that render it un-
derutilized.201  As an alternative to invalidating patents
through ex parte reexamination or litigation, the America In-
vents Act replaced inter partes reexamination with inter partes
review (IPR),202 and created post-grant review (PGR), both of
granted.  This leads to unwanted effects in patent litigation—namely, rising litiga-
tion costs through time spent in claim construction and the emergence of patent
trolls abusing the patent system.”).
197 See BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 94, at 55 (noting that during the 1990s R
the Federal Circuit reversed 34.5% of district court claim constructions).
198 See Ronald J. Mann, Do Patents Facilitate Financing in the Software Indus-
try?, 83 TEX. L. REV. 961, 1026 (2005) (“To the extent problems with patent quality
make it hard to predict whether a particular patent is or is not valid, they increase
the uncertainty and thus the threat value of trollish litigation.”).
199 See Rogers & Jeon, supra note 12, at 299 (discussing the incentive for R
defendants to settle even questionable suits if the outcome is unpredictable be-
cause of high litigation costs).
200 Lichtman & Lemley, supra note 186, at 51. R
201 See Eric Williams, Remembering the Public’s Interest in the Patent System –
A Post-Grant Opposition Designed to Benefit the Public, 2006 B.C. INTELL. PROP. &
TECH. F. 110702 (“[E]x parte reexamination . . . failed to meet the legislative
objective of providing a prompt, effective, and inexpensive alternative to litigation
for invalidating bad patents for four principle reasons: 1) limited participation
allowed by third parties; 2) narrow substantive grounds for which a review can be
requested . . . ; 3) lack of meaningful legal effect because courts are not bound by
the PTO’s decision and because reexamination and litigation can occur simulta-
neously; and 4) biased procedural measures causing an examiner to be more
inclined to favor granting reexamination.”).
202 Andrei Iancu et al., Challenging Validity of Issued Patents Before the PTO:
Inter Partes Reexam Now or Inter Partes Review Later?, 94 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK
OFF. SOC’Y 148, 148 (2012).  Although Congress created inter partes reexamina-
tion in 1999, it never caught on as an alternative to invalidating patents in court.
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which allow accused infringers and third parties not yet en-
snared in litigation to challenge the validity of a patent before
the PTO.203
These procedures are significant developments toward im-
proved patent quality and a reciprocal decrease in abusive pat-
ent litigation, as well as a direct tool to invalidate bad patents.
IPR and PGR provide a variety of advantages over invalidating
patents via litigation that decrease the cost of defending
against infringement suits, and the procedures allow potential
infringers to avoid such suits before they arise.204  Specifically,
IPR and PGR proceedings guarantee a decision on validity
within eighteen months of petitioning for review, and also allow
limited discovery, which collectively decrease costs, complexity,
and contingencies associated with prolonged litigation.205
More substantively, petitioners in IPR or PGR proceedings en-
joy lessened claim construction and evidentiary standards that
ease the burden of invalidating patents as opposed to doing so
in litigation.206  On one hand, a patent in such a proceeding is
not presumptively valid, and a petitioner in either proceeding
must prove invalidity only by a preponderance of the evidence
rather than by clear and convincing evidence.207  On the other
hand, a petitioner may utilize a broader range of prior art to
prove invalidity because the PTO will give claims in such pro-
ceedings their “broadest reasonable construction.”208  Further-
more, these proceedings may be particularly useful as a
defense to patent trolls.  Indeed, one study found that in the
first year IPR was available, nonpracticing entities owned
thirty-five percent of patents challenged through IPR, and also
constituted eighty-one percent of patent owners that settled
IPR proceedings.209  Nonetheless, both IPR and PGR are un-
See Jonathan Tamimi, Note, Breaking Bad Patents: The Formula for Quick, Inex-
pensive Resolution of Patent Validity, 29 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 587, 589–90 (2014).
203 See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112–29, § 6, 125 Stat.
284, 299–313 (2011) (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. §§ 311–319, 321–329
(2013)).  The AIA also created a procedure to challenge business method patents
before the PTO. See id. § 18.
204 See Irah H. Donner, Three Litigation Alternatives for Potential Defendants
Under the America Invents Act, INTELL. PROP. & TECH. L.J., Nov. 2014 at 12, 12
(“Companies should familiarize themselves with the potential benefits of these . . .
litigation alternatives, which in some cases, may enable them to avoid litigation
completely.”).
205 See Tamimi, supra note 202, at 594–602. R
206 See id. at 617–18.
207 Id. at 617.
208 Id. at 617–18 (quoting C.F.R. §§ 42.100(b), 42.200(b) (2013)).
209 See Yasser El-Gamal et al., The New Battlefield: One Year of Inter Partes
Review Under the America Invents Act, 42 AIPLA Q.J. 39, 51–52 (2014).
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available in certain cases, and IPR disallows certain invalidity
arguments, leaving alleged infringers of bad patents little rem-
edy but to proceed to litigation.
Though petitioners may invalidate any patent through liti-
gation or IPR, a straightforward limitation of PGR is that it is
only available for patents filed on or after March 16, 2013.210
Furthermore, a petitioner must seek PGR within nine months
of a patent’s issuance, and a petitioner may only pursue IPR
after this nine-month window, or after a PGR filed within such
window is terminated.211  Despite this dissymmetry, the more
broadly available IPR only allows petitioners to raise invalidity
arguments on novelty or nonobviousness grounds, and further
limits such arguments by only allowing a petitioner to rely on
prior art consisting of patents and printed publications.212
Conversely, PGR petitioners may challenge a patent on any
ground “relating to invalidity of the patent or any claim,”213 and
enjoy unlimited selection of prior art.214
Despite the advantages of IPR and PGR, the limitations of
these procedures burden their use in at least two ways that are
especially problematic in the context of abusive or frivolous
patent disputes.  First, because PGR is only available for chal-
lenging patents filed after March 16, 2013, a PGR petitioner
may not invalidate older patents, which PAEs often amass in
order to assert against practitioners of modern technology even
if the older, potentially unused patent could not have contem-
plated a newer, more innovative practice.215  Second, because
the only grounds available for challenging patents through IPR
are novelty and obviousness, a petitioner may not challenge a
patent in IPR for indefiniteness, which is another particularly
problematic source of patent litigation.216
210 See Olga Berson, Challenging Patent Validity Under the AIA: Strategic and
Tactical Considerations When Deciding Whether to Pursue Ex Parte Reexamination
or Inter Partes Review as Part of the Overall Litigation Strategy, in THE IMPACT OF
RECENT PATENT LAW CASES AND DEVELOPMENTS (2013 ed. 2012), 2012 WL 6636452,
at *1.
211 See 35 U.S.C. §§ 311(c), 321(c).
212 See Tamimi, supra note 202, at 627. R
213 Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112–29, § 6, 125 Stat. 284,
306, 334 (2011) (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. § 321(b)).
214 See Tamimi, supra note 202, at 627–28. R
215 See Ashley Chuang, Note, Fixing the Failures of Software Patent Protection:
Deterring Patent Trolling by Applying Industry-Specific Patentability Standards, 16
S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 215, 242 (2006) (“The limited opportunity for a post-grant
opposition thus does not shield any individual or corporation from the Trolling
Resurrecter—corporations like Ampex Corporation, which use decade-old patents
to solicit licenses on newly developed technology.”).
216 See supra notes 191–93 and accompanying text. R
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Remedies for these problems would be broadened windows
of availability for PGR proceedings and expanded grounds of
raising invalidity arguments in IPR proceedings.  Many, how-
ever, would likely lament such reforms because of the in-
creased administrative costs that this would impose on the
PTO.217  Such reasoning, however, reflects a flaw that is similar
to the flawed rationale in support of fee-shifting in patent litiga-
tion—namely, that the patent system should avoid costs up-
front and simply deal with the resulting costs when they
accrue.  Conversely, the patent system should internalize such
costs at the outset, before the PTO, rather than allowing such
costs to develop into more expensive disputes in the courts.
C. E-Discovery Reform: Updating Modern Civil Litigation
Although the current patent system has led to abundant
patent litigation, much of the massive costs involved in such
disputes are not specifically attributable to the patent system
but are symptomatic of defects in modern civil litigation gener-
ally.218  One such symptom is the current state of e-discovery—
patent disputes rely extraordinarily on e-discovery, and the
difficulty of resolving these cases short of trial only exacerbates
discovery costs.219  In response, the Federal Circuit proposed a
Model Order for e-discovery in patent cases with the goal of
making discovery more efficient and effective, as well as
preventing abusive discovery practices.220
Despite the Model Order’s specific tailoring to patent dis-
putes, it has the ambition—and potential—to advance modern
civil litigation generally.221  Indeed, the first item in the Model
Order reflects this ambition by quoting the first rule of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: “This order . . . streamlines
Electronically Stored Information (‘ESI’) production to promote
a ‘just, speedy, and inexpensive determination’ of [an] ac-
tion.”222  Because of “disproportionate, overbroad email pro-
217 See, e.g., James W. Beard, Note, A Better Carrot Incentivizing Patent Reex-
amination, 1 HASTINGS SCI. & TECH. L.J. 169, 179–83 (2009) (noting that additional
measures, such as “[e]xpanding the scope of evidence considered by the PTO,”
would increase the costs of proceedings).
218 See supra section I.B.2.
219 See Liang & Berliner, supra note 40, at 70. R
220 See Fed. Circuit Advisory Council, An E-Discovery Model Order, 21 FED.
CIR. B.J. 347, 348 (2012).
221 See Philip J. Favro & Derek P. Pullan, New Utah Rule 26: A Blueprint for
Proportionality Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 2012 MICH. ST. L. REV.
933, 958.
222 An E-Discovery Model Order, supra note 220, ¶ 1, at 352 (quoting FED R. R
CIV. P. 1) (emphasis added).
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duction requests, [which] carry staggering time and production
costs that have a debilitating effect on litigation,”223 the Model
Order recommends that parties request email production only
after the parties disclose basic information that is central to
any patent case.224  Furthermore, requests for email produc-
tion must be sufficiently specific, and the Model Order limits
such requests to five custodians per producing party, with five
narrowly tailored search terms per custodian.225  Under the
Model Order, a court may shift costs to a requesting party for
discovery requests that go beyond the Model Order’s limita-
tions on custodians and search terms.226  In addition, a court
may shift costs for “disproportionate ESI production requests”
while allowing consideration of “a party’s nonresponsive or dil-
atory discovery tactics,”227 or, conversely, “meaningful compli-
ance with [the Model] Order and efforts to promote efficiency
and reduce costs.”228
The Model Order’s simple, cost-effective approach to e-dis-
covery makes it one that any area of litigation should embrace
as a prototype to deal with the complications of e-discovery.
Indeed, a number of courts have adopted the Model Order in
specific cases or are implementing similar programs in patent
cases or broader commercial litigation settings.229  Further-
more, the Model Order’s cost-shifting provisions incentivize
parties to treat discovery only as a means of uncovering rele-
vant facts rather than improperly using discovery as negotia-
tion leverage.  As opposed to fee-shifting under section 285, the
Model Order’s targeted focus toward discovery does not require
a court to analyze the merits of a case.230  In addition, this
more particularized cost-shifting mechanism, with expressly
stated triggers that parties may modify as they see fit,231 makes
the costs of litigation more predictable ex ante, largely eliminat-
ing the uncertainty surrounding fee-shifting under section
223 Id. at 348.
224 See id. ¶ 8, at 352.
225 See id. ¶¶ 7, 9, 10, 11, at 352–53.
226 See id. ¶¶ 10, 11, at 353.
227 Id. ¶ 3, at 352.
228 Id. ¶¶ 3, 4, at 352.
229 See Peter J. Corcoran, III, Strategies to Save Resources and Reduce
E-Discovery Costs in Patent Litigation, 21 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 103, 113–25
(2013) (listing the adoption of model orders and programs in the Eastern District
of Texas, Northern District of California, International Trade Commission, Sev-
enth Circuit Court of Appeals, District of Delaware, and Southern District of New
York).
230 See supra subpart III.A.
231 See An E-Discovery Model Order, supra note 220, ¶¶ 2, 10, 11, at 352–53. R
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285.  Indeed, cost-shifting under the Model Order is more a
matter of attributing costs to the party that creates them (i.e.,
internalization) than punishing or deterring such activities.232
This increased certainty and emphasis on internalizing exter-
nalities is therefore not only an effective preventive measure
toward abusive litigation practices in patent cases, but in mod-
ern civil litigation generally, which courts should follow.
CONCLUSION
Awarding attorneys’ fees liberally in patent cases and cur-
tailing the Federal Circuit’s ability to second-guess such deci-
sions is a framework that will likely create more negative effects
than improvements for litigants, patentees, and the patent and
civil litigation systems.  This interpretation of section 285 will
be difficult to apply, increase litigation costs, deter settlement,
and chill patent enforcement, and the Federal Circuit’s de-
creased role will only exacerbate these consequences.  Instead
of looking to punish certain patent litigants, courts, Congress,
and commentators should focus their efforts toward systemic
reforms that would force the patent system to internalize social
costs that develop as a result of poor patent quality.  More
ambitiously, abusive patent litigation should be a call to up-
date American civil litigation by seeking out and implementing
novel approaches such as the Federal Circuit’s Model Order.
232 See Lance Shapiro, E-Discovery: Bargaining Bytes for Settlement, 27 GEO.
J. LEGAL ETHICS 887, 893 (2014) (Cost-shifting under the Model Order “is signifi-
cant because it puts the cost of the data in the hands of the seeker, rather than
the provider,” and “if the requesting party believes that additional discovery will be
beneficial, then the discovering party will conduct a cost-benefit analysis to deter-
mine the optimal level of discovery.”).
